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INTRODUCTION
In a recent decision out of the Fifth Circuit, the court ruled that
under the New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York
Convention"),1 only courts in countries with primary jurisdiction
may effectively vacate an arbitral award.2 Primary jurisdiction is
limited to the country that serves as the situs of the arbitration and
possibly the home of the applicable procedural law, if different than
the situs of the arbitration.' Further, the Fifth Circuit held that courts
with secondary jurisdiction may only decide whether arbitral awards
B.A. University of Virginia (2002), J.D. American University, Washington
College of Law (2005). The author served as the Senior Critical Essays Editor of
the American University International Law Review from 2004-05.
1. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards [hereinafter New York Convention], June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330
U.N.T.S. 38 (mandating reciprocal enforcement for all signatory countries).
2. See Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 287 (5th Cir. 2004).
3. See discussion infra Part III (addressing the New York Convention's
provisions regarding annulments and construction of such provisions).
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will be enforced within that country.4 Secondary jurisdictions are
countries subject to the New York Convention outside of those with
primary jurisdiction.' Parties obtaining annulments in secondary
jurisdictions may not attempt to use such annulments as a defense to
enforcement in other jurisdictions pursuant to the New York
Convention.6 Thus, annulment decisions by courts in countries with
secondary jurisdiction should not prevent enforcement elsewhere. 7
I. BACKGROUND TO THE KARAHA BODAS
DECISION
Several years before the Fifth Circuit holding, the U.S. Supreme
Court had already decided Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert
Construction Co., in which the Court held that the venue provisions
of the Federal Arbitration Act8 ("FAA") are permissive.' In Cortez
Byrd, the Court held that the FAA allowed venues outside of the
place of the award to effectively vacate arbitral awards as long as the
jurisdiction was appropriate under the general venue statute. 10
Accordingly, a Mississippi court was permitted to vacate an Alabama
arbitral award."
4. Karaha Bodas Co., 364 F.3d at 287.
5. See discussion infra Part III (describing the differences between primary
and secondary jurisdictions).
6. Karaha Bodas Co., 364 F.3d at 287.
7. Id.
8. 9 U.S.C. § 201-208 (2000) (implementing the New York Convention as the
Federal Arbitration Act).
9. Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction Co., 529 U.S. 193
(2000) (resolving the split between the U.S. Courts of Appeals as to whether the
FAA's venue provision are permissive or mandatory).
10. Id. at204.
11. See id. (overturning the Eleventh Circuit, which had held that venue was
limited to the Northern District of Alabama). The arbitration arose pursuant to a
contract dispute between Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. and Bill Harbert Construction
Company regarding Harbert's construction of a wood chip mill for Cortez Byrd in
Mississippi. Id. at 195. After the arbitration panel issued an award in favor of
Harbert, Cortez Byrd filed a motion to vacate or modify the award in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi. Id. at 196. In
response, Harbert filed a motion to confirm the award in the Northern District of
Alabama. Id. Cortez Byrd then sought to dismiss, transfer, or stay the Alabama
action. Id. The Alabama court denied the motion and held that Alabama was the
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Despite the potential benefits of allowing permissive construction
of venue provisions for vacatur in the domestic context,1 2 the Cortez
Byrd Court also inferred that similar reasoning should apply when
considering foreign arbitral awards.13 Such reasoning should be
analyzed and compared with the recent finding by the Fifth Circuit in
Karaha Bodas and with traditional notions of lex loci arbitri.
II. KARAHA BODAS V. PERTAMINA
In 1994, Karaha Bodas Co. ("KBC") entered into two contracts
with Indonesia's national gas and oil company, Perusahaan
Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara ("Pertamina"), to
build and operate a geothermal electricity development facility in
Indonesia. 14 A contract dispute led to arbitration in Switzerland
pursuant to the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law Arbitration Rules.15 The contract stipulated Indonesian law as
the applicable substantive law. 16 The arbitral tribunal held Pertamina
liable and awarded KBC damages for expenses and lost profits.'
only proper venue for motions to confirm, vacate, or modify the award. Id. The
Alabama court thereafter entered judgment in favor of Harbert. Id.
12. See Karyn A. Doi, Recent Development, Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill
Harbert Construction Co., 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 409, 418 (2001)
(discussing the positive arbitration policies reinforced by Cortez Byrd).
13. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text (describing the Cortez Byrd
decision and its discussion of international arbitration and concerns regarding
actions to vacate or modify awards rendered in non-signatory states).
14. See Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 282 (5th Cir. 2004) (discussing the relevant contracts at
issue, which gave KBC the right to develop energy sources in Indonesia with
Pertamina's management and to sell electrical energy to an electric utility owned
by the Indonesian government).
15. See id. at 282-83 (explaining the Indonesian government's suspension of
the energy project due to the country's financial problems, which in turn led to the
contract dispute between KBC and Pertamina).
16. See id. at 290-91 (referring to the relevant provisions in the contracts
between KBC and Pertamina, which explicitly state that they are governed by the
substantive laws of Indonesia).
17. See id. at 284-85 (awarding $261.1 million in damages to KBC).
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After receiving the favorable award, KBC filed suit in federal
district court in Texas to enforce the arbitral award.18 As the
enforcement action in the U.S. court was pending, Pertamina sought
and was denied annulment of the award in Swiss courts.19 The Texas
district court enforced the arbitral award20 and Pertamina thereafter
sought annulment in Indonesia.21 In 2002, Indonesian courts vacated
the arbitral award and attempted to prevent its enforcement
elsewhere. 2 In 2004, the Fifth Circuit rejected the argument that the
Indonesian annulment provided a defense to enforcement under the
New York Convention and held that the Indonesian annulment did
not prevent U.S. courts from enforcing the arbitral award.23
Noah Rubins has pointed out the failures of the Indonesian
judiciary in denying enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and
failing to promote the values of the New York Convention, most
recently highlighted by its attempted annulment in Karaha Bodas.24
Despite the internal failings within Indonesia represented by the
annulment in Karaha Bodas,25 the question raised by the case and its
18. Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Bumi Negara,
190 F. Supp. 2d 936 (S.D. Tex. 2001), aff'd, 364 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 2004).
19. See Karaha Bodas Co., 364 F.3d at 285 (describing how the Texas district
court slowed the proceedings to await the Swiss court's decision).
20. Karaha Bodas Co., 190 F. Supp. 2d at 957.
21. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Bumi Negara v. Karaha Bodas Co.,
Case No. 86/PDT.G/2002/PN.JKT.PST, Preliminary Award (Central Jakarta State
Court 2002) (unofficial translation), available at http://www.lfip.org/lawe506/
documents/sessionl4/e506kbjakartadctprelim.doc (last visited July 12, 2005).
22. Id.
23. See Karaha Bodas Co., 364 F.3d at 310 ("Under the New York
Convention, the parties' arbitration agreement, and this record, Switzerland had
primary jurisdiction over the Award.") The court held that Indonesia did not have
primary jurisdiction and the court therefore affirmed the district court's decision
that the Indonesian annulment could not be used as a proper defense to
enforcement in the United States under the New York Convention. Id.
24. See Noah Rubins, The Enforcement and Annulment of International
Arbitration Awards in Indonesia, 20 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 359 (2005) (describing
the Indonesian court's decision to annul the arbitration award). Mr. Rubins argues
that the Indonesian annulment was based on "unpredictable and unprincipled
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intersection with U.S. Supreme Court dicta in Cortez Byrd reaches to
a much larger issue: what are the effects of annulments of foreign
arbitral awards outside of the place of arbitration and outside of the
country whose procedural law applied to the arbitration? When and
how must other states recognize annulments rendered in a party's
home country?
III. KARAHA BODAS, CORTEZ BYRD, AND
TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF LEXLOCIARBITRI
Effective annulments in international arbitration cause awards to
lose the protection of the comprehensive enforcement regime of the
New York Convention. 26 Relevant portions of the Convention allow
annulment by a "competent authority of the country in which, or the
country under the law of which, the award was made. 27 Scholars
26. Article V(1) of the New York Convention provides:
1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of
the party against whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the
competent authority where the recognition and enforcement is sought, proof
that:
(a) The parties to the agreement referred to in article II were, under the law
applicable to them, under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid
under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication
thereon, under the law of the country where the award was made; or
(b) The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice
of the appointment of the arbitrator or of the arbitration proceedings or was
otherwise unable to present his case; or
(c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling
within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on
matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not
so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters
submitted to arbitration may be recognized and enforced; or
(d) The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not
in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement,
was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took
place; or
(e) The award has not yet become binding on the parties, or has been set aside
or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the
law of which, that award was made.
New York Convention, supra note 1, 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 40, 42.
27. Id. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 42 (setting forth this provision under Article
V(1)(e)).
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have described the textual references to annulments of arbitral
awards in the Convention as somewhat ambiguous,28 but numerous
courts and scholars have interpreted the phrase "the country under
the law of which" to be referring solely to the parties choice of
procedural law.29
Although under the New York Convention it is possible that there
would be two countries with primary jurisdiction, several
commentators maintain that there should be only one country with
primary jurisdiction. 0 Despite these analyses, the situs of the arbitral
award and the country whose procedural law is used could
potentially, although unlikely for practical purposes, both have
primary jurisdiction.31 Thus, the situs of the award or the country
whose procedural law is used would be the only proper forums for
vacatur that could have extraterritorial effects on other signatories of
the New York Convention.32 Under the Convention, signatory
28. See Rubins, supra note 24, at 388 (explaining that although the text of
Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention is ambiguous, case law clearly
establishes that it refers to the situs of the arbitration and to the country whose
procedural law applied to the arbitration). See generally William W. Park, Duty
and Discretion in International Arbitration, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 805 (1999)
(discussing the confusion regarding effects of annulments of international
arbitration awards under the New York Convention). Further, the New York
Convention does not set forth any standards for annulment decisions. See New
York Convention, supra note 1. Signatories are free to develop their own grounds
for annulment. See id.
29. See Int'l Standard Elec. Corp. v. Bridas Sociedad Anonima Petrolera,
Industrial Y Comercial, 745 F. Supp. 172, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) ("[W]e conclude
that the phrase in the Convention '[the country] under the laws of which that award
was made' undoubtedly referenced the complex thicket of the procedural law of
arbitration. .. ."). See generally Rubins, supra note 24, at 387-91 (discussing U.S.
and foreign court interpretation of Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention).
30. See Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 308-09 (5th Cir. 2004) (stating that although the New York
Convention suggests the possibility of more than one country having primary
jurisdiction, the predominant view is that only one country has such jurisdiction in
a particular case). Allowing only one country to exercise primary jurisdiction is
consistent with the purposes of the New York Convention to provide predictability
and neutrality in international business. Id. at 309.
31. See id. at 291 (noting that selection of a procedural law outside of the place
of the arbitration would be "complex, inconvenient, and inconsistent with the
selection of a neutral forum as the arbitral forum").
32. Id. at 287.
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countries may still choose to enforce a properly vacated award
because the provisions of Article V(1)(e) are not mandatory,33 but
courts will most often defer to those with primary jurisdiction."
Typically, the situs of the arbitration's procedural law is used, but
parties can stipulate otherwise if they do so explicitly.35
Other than the two potential countries with primary jurisdiction to
vacate an arbitral award, "[c]ourts in other countries have secondary
jurisdiction; a court in a country with secondary jurisdiction is
limited to deciding whether the award may be enforced in that
country. 36 While primary jurisdictions may use their own domestic
law to determine whether to vacate or set aside an arbitral award,
secondary jurisdictions determining whether to refuse enforcement
of an award are limited to the grounds set forth in the New York
Convention.37 Using this logic, because Swiss law was determined to
33. See New York Convention, supra note 1, 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S.
at 42 (stating under Article V(1)(e) that enforcement of arbitral awards "may be
refused" if vacated in a country with primary jurisdiction). The Convention's use
of "may" highlights the discretionary basis for courts to refuse to enforce vacated
awards. Id.; see also Chromalloy Aeroservices v. Arab Republic of Egypt, 939 F.
Supp. 907, 909 (D.D.C. 1996) (discussing the non-mandatory provisions of Article
V of the New York Convention and enforcing an arbitration award vacated at the
place of arbitration). The court held that Article VII of the New York Convention
allows courts to recognize a vacated award if such award was set aside for reasons
not recognized in the enforcing country. Id.
34. See Pippa Read, Delocalization of International Commercial Arbitration:
Its Relevance in the New Millennium, 10 AM. REV. INT'LARB. 177, 190 (1999)
(describing the usual practice of courts to recognize annulments and to set aside
arbitral awards vacated in courts with primary jurisdiction).
35. See New York Convention, supra note 1, 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S.
at 42 (providing under Article V(1)(d) that enforcement of an award may be
refused where the "composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure
was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such
agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration
took place"); see also Karaha Bodas Co., 364 F.3d at 292 (discussing the need for
an "express designation" to rebut the strong presumption that the place of the
arbitration also provides the applicable procedural law). "Under the New York
Convention, an agreement specifying the place of the arbitration creates a
presumption that the procedural law of that place applies to the arbitration." Id. at
291.
36. Karaha Bodas Co., 364 F.3d at 287.
37. See id. at 288 (noting the "much broader discretion to set aside an award"
in primary jurisdictions).
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be the procedural law used in Karaha Bodas3" and because
Switzerland was the situs of the award,39 Switzerland was therefore
the only country with primary jurisdiction to annul the arbitral
award.40
The result in Karaha Bodas would have been the same whether
the court interpreted the New York Convention to allow two primary
jurisdictions or one because Switzerland was both the situs of the
arbitration and the home of the applicable procedural law.41 Because
Switzerland was the only country with primary jurisdiction, the Fifth
Circuit reasoned that Indonesia's annulment was improper and
therefore, should have no effects outside of Indonesia.42 Yet, it is
unclear whether the U.S. Supreme Court would agree with this line
of reasoning.
In Cortez Byrd, the U.S. Supreme Court held that despite the
willingness of parties to pick an inconvenient forum as the place of
the arbitration, they "might well be less willing to pick such a
location if any future court proceedings had to be held there."43 The
Court explained that if the venue provisions of the FAA were held to
be mandatory, forums outside of the district of the arbitration would
still be able to consider a motion to confirm an award, but could not
also hear a motion to vacate or modify the same award.44 The Court
rejected such an outcome and stated "Congress simply cannot be
tagged with such a taste for the bizarre. '45 The Court went on to
38. Id. at 291-92.
39. Id. at 282-83.
40. Id. at 309-10.
41. See id. at 309 ("In this case, both of the New York Convention criteria for
the country with primary jurisdiction point to Switzerland-and only to
Switzerland.")
42. Id. at 310.
43. Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Construction Co., 529 U.S. 193,
201 (2000).
44. See id. at 200-01 (describing that if the venue provisions were mandatory,
in a situation where a proceeding to confirm an award was taking place outside of
the district of the arbitration and the responding party objected to the confirmation,
the responding party must therefore go back to the district of the arbitration to
initiate a separate proceeding). The parties would then have to be involved in
proceedings in multiple forums regarding the same award. Id.
45. Id. at 201.
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describe how the flexibility provided to parties by allowing them to
freely negotiate where an arbitration will take place "could well be
inhibited by a venue rule mandating the same inconvenient venue if
someone later sought to vacate or modify the award."46
In part, the Court rested its decision on the effects of venue
restrictions on motions to confirm, modify, and vacate awards in the
international context.47 The Court, referring to the New York
Convention and to the Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration,48 described how restricting "venue to the
site of the arbitration would preclude any action under the FAA in
courts of the United States to confirm, modify, or vacate awards
rendered in foreign arbitrations not covered by either convention.
49
The Court was concerned that actions to enforce foreign arbitral
awards rendered in non-signatory states would be defeated in the
United States due to venue restrictions.50
The Court in Cortez Byrd made no distinction in its discussion of
international arbitration as to whether broader recognition of
annulments should be allowed for foreign arbitral awards only from
non-signatory states or from all foreign seats of arbitration.5
Specifically in the domestic context, Cortez Byrd discussed the
rationale behind allowing parties to seek annulment in their home
jurisdiction. While the Court's discussion revolved primarily
around the domestic system, the discussion shows that its reasoning
was significantly shaped by effects on the international regime. 3
46. Id.
47. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text (discussing the U.S.
Supreme Court dicta in Cortez Byrd regarding venue restrictions applicable to the
confirmation, modification, or vacatur of foreign arbitral awards).
48. Jan. 30, 1975, 104 Stat. 449, 1438 U.N.T.S. 249.
49. Cortez Byrd, 529 U.S. at 202-03.
50. See id. at 203 ("Although such actions would not necessarily be barred for
lack of jurisdiction, they would be defeated by restrictions on venue, and
anomalies like that are to be avoided when they can be.")
51. Id. at202-03.
52. Id. at 200 ("The most convenient forum for a defendant is normally the
forum of residence, and it would take a very powerful reason ever to suggest that
Congress would have meant to eliminate that venue for postarbitration disputes.")
53. Id. at 202-03.
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Although the U.S. Supreme Court seemed to believe that its
construction of the FAA would provide the most favorable outcome
for arbitration,54 using the logic of Cortez Byrd in an international
context would allow vacatur in home countries of parties seeking
annulment of arbitral awards in contravention of traditional
interpretations of the New York Convention.55 Professor William
Park has noted that this result could have drastic consequences on the
international arbitration regime.56 In Karaha Bodas, this would allow
Pertamina's successful annulment action at home in Indonesia to
effectively vacate the arbitration award and potentially prevent
enforcement elsewhere. Additionally, the New York Convention
refers to no such application.57 As discussed earlier, under the
Convention only the situs of the place of the award and potentially
the law under which the award was made may appropriately vacate
the award and thereafter provide other countries with an additional
ground to deny enforcement.58 Other countries merely have the
authority to refuse to enforce awards that have not been vacated in
the primary jurisdiction. 9
Allowing parties seeking annulment to successfully reach such a
result at home negates the neutrality of international arbitration.60
54. See Doi, supra note 12, at 418 (describing the U.S. Supreme Court's liberal
construction of the FAA in Cortez Byrd as most favorable to arbitration).
55. See William W. Park, Amending the Federal Arbitration Act, 13 AM. REv.
INT'L ARB. 75, 125 (2002) (suggesting that application of the reasoning of Cortez
Byrd to an international context would allow parties to seek annulments at home).
56. See id. (describing how a more widespread ability to effectively vacate
arbitral awards in the international context would have "dramatically disagreeable
results"). Professor Park notes that the Cortez Byrd reasoning might not have great
effects on the domestic regime, but suggests an international example where a
Massachusetts seller and German buyer agree to arbitration in London not
expecting that despite their attempts to seek a neutral forum, they might still be
subject to the courts of Germany and the United States. Id.
57. See New York Convention, supra note 1.
58. See id.
59. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text (analyzing the ability of
countries with secondary jurisdiction to refuse to enforce awards, but not to vacate
under Article V(1)(e) of the New York Convention).
60. See Park, supra note 55, at 126 (recognizing stability as one of the great
achievements of international arbitration and noting the potential danger of
applying the Cortez Byrd reasoning in the international context).
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This rationale applies particularly to a case like Karaha Bodas,
where the party seeking annulment was an Indonesian state-owned
entity. 61 Neutrality is one of the primary aims and reasons for
popularity of international arbitration. 62 The U.S. Supreme Court's
desire to allow home annulment of foreign awards not covered by
international arbitration conventions seems a less critical goal than
preservation of the larger neutral and predictable international
arbitration regime.
Alternatively, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Cortez Byrd
could be subject to a narrower interpretation. Because the Court was
interpreting the venue provision under the FAA, the Court
presumably could support a broader ability to effectively vacate
foreign arbitral awards in certain international contexts, but analyze
these cases under the provisions of the applicable international
convention. In cases where there is no applicable convention, there
would be no need to construe the ability to effectively vacate awards
in a more limited manner than the Court's analysis in Cortez Byrd.
For instance, by finding that the FAA allows permissive use of
effective vacatur when not explicitly precluded by international
convention, U.S. courts could hear motions to confirm, modify, or
vacate foreign arbitral awards rendered in non-signatory countries.
This logic does not necessarily mean U.S. courts would have to
recognize broader application of vacatur for foreign awards rendered
in countries that are signatories of the New York Convention or the
Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration.
In those cases, courts could then look to the applicable convention
provisions governing vacatur. This interpretation would be consistent
with the U.S. Supreme Court's concern regarding venue restrictions
on awards rendered in non-signatory states while preserving
traditional notions of lex loci arbitri under the New York
Convention.
61. See Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi
Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 281 (5th Cir. 2004) (describing how the Indonesian
government owns Pertamina).
62. See Park, supra note 55, at 102 ("Often an arbitral situs is chosen only for
geographical convenience or procedural neutrality, and the dispute involves neither
property nor activity at the place of arbitration.")
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CONCLUSION
In Karaha Bodas, the Fifth Circuit reinforced a predictable and
efficient international arbitration regime by holding that courts in a
secondary jurisdiction have the authority only to refuse enforcement
of an award. The Fifth Circuit did not allow an Indonesian state-
owned entity to effectively vacate an award in its home country
when Indonesia neither served as the situs of the arbitration nor
provided the applicable procedural law. The court's reasoning
effectuates preservation of the negotiated terms of the contract at
issue and the justified expectations of international business.
Although Karaha Bodas exemplified such laudable goals, it is
questionable whether its reasoning is consistent with the dicta of the
U.S. Supreme Court in Cortez Byrd, which seemingly approves the
use of home jurisdictions to effectively vacate arbitral awards, even
in the international context.63 Despite this analysis, Karaha Bodas
would be consistent with a narrow interpretation of Cortez Byrd,
where U.S. courts recognize a broader ability to vacate foreign
awards, but only when such award is not covered by an international
convention that approaches vacatur in a more limited manner.64
63. See discussion supra Part III (evaluating the U.S. Supreme Court's dicta in
Cortez Byrd with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Karaha Bodas).
64. See discussion supra Part III (suggesting a narrow interpretation of Cortez
Byrd, applicable to the confirmation, modification, and annulment of foreign
awards rendered in non-signatory states).
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